The Three Stooges – A Headingley Autopsy

joe-besser-on-the-three-stooges-1-e1363055291247

It’s tempting to just blame Cook. He’s an easy target. Few people seem to like him. He’s going through another one of his batting malaises (they’ve happened before and they’ll happen again) and his captaincy yesterday was lamentable.

However, let’s not forget that Cook’s captaincy is simply a product of the Andy Flower era. Under Flower’s iron fist, England became utterly dependent on stats and pre-determined methodologies. Plans were determined before games and Flower’s captains stuck religiously to them irrespective of match circumstances.

The only real difference between Strauss and Cook is that the former led a more experienced team with more match-winners. The methodology has not really evolved much at all.

Under Flower England became robotic. Nothing was instinctive or even reactive. It’s hardly a surprise that Cook learned very little about captaincy during this time. Listening to the coach, and sticking to predetermined plans, no matter how futile, is all the poor bloke knows.

Now that Peter Moores is in place – a coach from the same philosophical mould – England are doing the same things: relying on one inflexible plan and totally failing to read situations and adapt accordingly.

It’s no secret what England’s plan involved: “the Lankans don’t like it up ‘em, so lets bowl short and scare the little b******s”. And it should be no surprise that England stuck to this plan, religiously. The computer doesn’t lie.

The failure of this strategy was compounded by Moores’ foolish promise to play positive cricket – something his philosophy is actually at odds with. He obviously mistook physically aggressive (but brainless) cricket, for positive cricket. He didn’t realise that positive cricket at Leeds means pitching the bloody ball up.

England’s tactics yesterday were some of the most brainless I’ve ever witnessed on a cricket field. They had no saving grace, and were abysmal from start to finish; it wasn’t just bad in patches.

At the start of the day, with just a few overs left before the new ball, Cook set relatively defensive fields and handed the ball to his fastest, but least economical bowler, Liam Plunkett. There’s a contraction in logic there.

Meanwhile, the defensive tactics smacked of putting all of England’s eggs in the new ball basket. We effectively gave Matthews and Jayawardene a net before the pressure was finally exerted half an hour into the morning.

We let Sri Lanka off the hook. Rather than realising that the opposition was the team under pressure (they were, after all, the equivalent of 100-4 at the start of play) Cook acted like England were the ones on the ropes. It told us everything we need to know about Cook’s state of mind.

At the start of the day Sri Lanka’s primary aim would have been to make sure their two established batsmen were at the crease when the new ball came. They would have been reluctant to take risks, and satisfied with consolidation and survival. Instead, England acted like the anxious team.

England should have seized the moment and attacked from the word go. They should have saved the seamers, got the spinner on to bowl a few overs until the new ball was available, and put several men around the bat, ready to capitalise on any inside edges that might result from the defensive prods that would inevitably come.

Sri Lanka were highly unlikely to take Mooen on given the circumstances, especially considering the fact he had taken two excellent wickets the night before. You bowl your spinner on a dry pitch with an old ball. You don’t bowl the seamers come what may, even when the conditions and the state of the ball is against them.

At the other end, Anderson or Broad, the two senior bowlers, should have been given a few overs – even if it was just a couple each. It would have been the last thing Sri Lanka wanted. What’s more the key seamers would have been loose when the new ball finally arrived. Perhaps they wouldn’t have served up such dross if they were already in the grove.

Most of all, however, the fields should have been attacking. This would have told the batsmen they’d have to work hard if they wanted to be around when the new ball came.

A fielding captain only gets so many chances to attack: at the start of sessions, when wickets fall, and when the new ball arrives. He cannot attack when his team has been pushed onto the defensive and the batsmen are well set. Cook’s instinct should have been to attack first, and then defend if it all went wrong.

By surrendering the initiative to Sri Lanka at the start of play, the batsmen were already on top when the new ball came. The result was painfully predictable: when the new cherry was taken, Cook could only afford two slips. By delaying his offensive by half and hour, he missed the opportunity to go on the offensive altogether. After that, the wheels fell off.

England’s tactics during the key Matthews and Herath partnership were also abysmal. It has been well documented, so I won’t go on about it too long, but England gave easy singles to Matthews whilst ‘attacking’ Herath with a constant barrage of short balls.

There was no imagination, no plan B, just the constant reassertion of a continually failing strategy. Which brings us back to the coaches …

We all know by now that Cook does not (or maybe cannot) read matches and think for himself. England’s strategy in this match would therefore have been decided by Moores, Farbrace and a bowling coach who has a habit of telling England’s bowlers to bowl too short.

For this the management have no excuse. It was their first test as a coaching team and they fluffed their lines in embarrassing fashion.

Farbrace in particular should have known what bloody length to bowl at Headingley. Instead he appeared on Sky on Sunday evening and denied the bowlers had done anything wrong:

“I refuse to criticise the seamers” he said. “They’ve bowled brilliantly through these test matches, and they’re human: they’re allowed one off session”.

Farbrace was wrong. England’s bowlers bowled the wrong length in the entire test match. They wasted the new ball three times and the coaches did nothing to put things right – which implies they either agreed with the strategy or had formulated it themselves.

Basically Moores, Farbrace and Saker blew it. They were outcoached at Farbrace’s own home ground by a team playing in totally alien conditions.

This is the most worrying thing of all. Cook’s critics might think he’ll resign, but Moores won’t. He’s only just started the job.

Moores will have a least this summer, and the winter too – how strange that England will be led into the World Cup by a coach who has never won a single limited overs trophy in his long domestic career.

I was all for giving this new coaching team a chance. I supported the team passionately since the first day at Lord’s, but my faith is dwindling fast.

There is still time for Moores and Farbrace to get things right, but this debacle at Headingley – and debacle probably isn’t a strong enough word – is extremely worrying. It has made our coaches look totally foolish and out of their depth.

Make no mistake. To lose a game after being 311-3, after bowling the opposition out for 257, is simply unforgivable. It is, in my opinion, the worst defeat by an England team since I started watching cricket in the late 1980s.

Yes there have been awful days before, but when we capitulated at Adelaide in 2006 for example, we were playing against McGrath, Warne and Co. Yesterday our batsmen were skittled by a medium pacer whose 22 test wickets before this match had come at an average of over fifty.

It is utterly, utterly demoralising and I have no idea how our problems can be solved when English cricket is run by intransigent, aloof, pseudo-politicians  who only seem to think about short-term financial gains rather than growing the game and broadening its appeal.

They can talk about ‘team ethics’ all they want. The bottom line is that they’re clueless when it comes to assembling a winning team. The ECB are only good at one thing: getting their own way, whether it be at the ICC, keeping the mainstream media in its box, or purging the dressing room of individuals they dislike.

James Morgan

14 comments

  • Excellent summary

    Of course you realise that Peter Moores is the David Moyes of the cricket world. Judging by the play this morning England cannot escape being negative – taking their time, dawdling about seeming only to want to play for a draw. paying fans don’t appear to matter to them.

  • Excellent summary. Farbrace seems to have slipped under the radar. After England pinched him from Sri Lanka, everyone said it would weaken SL and give England insights into the SL team. I’d guess the Sri Lankans won’t be crying too much about it now.

  • A brilliant summary James. Just brilliant. Terrible management and poor judgement and poor captaincy. I wonder if the management throughout thought this was be a walkover test? Over-estimated their ability to just wipe out the Sri Lankans? I notice tonight on the high-lights that Mark Nicholas didn’t ask the real questions, whereas Aggers didn’t shift from it. Cook determined to carry on and I cannot see the ECB sacking him – too much loss of face! So here comes India. Wonder what the pundits are going to say about India? How inferior they are as a team to England?

    Well done Sri Lanka. They played well and deserved to win and looked like a team playing for, and supporting, each other. Very impressed with them. Well done.

  • Despite his runs at Lord’s, Prior’s place would be under threat under any normal circumstances. He’s had an awful series with the gloves and his batting still looks problematic.

    So… parachute in Foster as a temp captain to bring together the band of merry youngsters? Never happen, I know…

    • Burly, are you actually James Foster himself?! :-)

      I am actually a lot more worried about Prior now than I was two weeks ago. It’s his weakness against the short ball is a real problem if he’s going to play in the Ashes. He used to be a compulsive hooker. Perhaps he should simply take it on again, and go down fighting, as he sure looks incapable of riding the bounce, swaying or ducking atm.

      • Haha, no. I went through a period of getting a bit fed up about how much people would talk up Foster, as every time I saw him he’d make a big error. “That’s out of character”, the commentators would say. Yeah, right.

        Long time ago now though.

        Either we go Buttler – who’s doing what’s needed with the bat, but I don’t know about the gloves – or we pick a proper, top quality keeper and let him stake a claim. We do have some really good keepers.

  • Missing Graeme Swann, that’s what it looks like to me. Cook doesn’t want to bowl Ali. No quality spin bowler that the skipper trusts is a massive loss.

  • As someone who used to play club cricket at a very low standard, I cannot understand why Mr James Anderson was not given instructions before he went out to save the game.

    With one over to play out for a draw it should be obvious to anyone with a modicum of batting sense that the main thought must be ‘Don’t play at anything you don’t have to’.

    Therefore the simple solution is to take your guard and ignore anything that is not going to hit the wicket. If the bowler produces a short pitched ball then that is surely a gift for a batsman intent only on survival.

    Jimmy however decided that he had to play balls up around his neck, a dangerous tactic which proved his undoing.

    If anything points to the fact that England cricket coaches don’t have a clue then this must surely be it.

    • “Jimmy however decided that he had to play balls up around his neck, a dangerous tactic which proved his undoing.”

      Come on, he is a number 11. It was the one thing he got wrong in 10 overs. Sheer defensive reaction. Moeen was talking to him all the time, I defy anybody to say that their reaction to that ball wouldn’t have been the same.

      • I am sorry but a professional cricketer in that siutaion should either have been coached what to do or know himself what to do – you speak of Jimmy as a number 11, first of all he was always the nominated night watchman so that must mean he is considered to have a decent batsman’s brain and secondly a test number eleven would open the batting for most club sides – don’t forget you are talking about someone who has hit sixes and fours off bowlers who a club cricketer would not have the time to react to.

        A friend of mine who was a very decent club opener faced John Price years ago.and said he didn’t see most balls bowled to him.

        • One ball in 60 – if he’d done it with the 2nd or 3rd ball of his innings would you have been so down on him? If just ONE of the recognised batsmen had got just two more runs, it wouldn’t have mattered. Expecting a number 11 to save a game is not very fair. I’d wear that expectation coming from the ECB board and coaches, but not from supporters.

          • I thought it was fairly obvious that it would have been better if we had only lost five wickets and Jimmy hadn’t appeared, Plunkett got out stupidly the night before, Cook has not played well for ages, Prior is susceptible to short pitched bowling and on and on.

            But the fact is that, with one over left to play Jimmy Anderson had the chance to save the game for England. Now I actually think that it may be good that England lost because there is so much wrong with English cricket and something needs to be done.

            But I also think that cricketers show know, are be coached, how to react to certain situations.

            And my opinion, and you have yours, is that Jimmy Anderson should have ignored any balls obviously passing well over the wicket. Why did that thought seemingly not occur to him?

            • Yes, I agree with your reasoning but not with laying the blame at Jimmy’s door. I’m sure, having blocked and ducked and weaved for 10 overs, his mindset was that he ws going to save the game. Something happened, and I suspect in that split second he thought “this thing is going to smash my face” and his instinct (and mine). would have been to prevent that happening. The fact that he decided to use the bat instead of ducking simply shows that his 2 seconds are up, his options are there, and he’s chosen the wrong one.

              That’s how games are won and lost,

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